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PREVENTING UNDER-EQUIPPED
MEDICAL FACILITIES FROM KILLING
HEART ATTACK PATIENTS:
CORRECTING INEFFICIENCIES IN THE
CURRENT REGULATORY PARADIGM
FOR PROVIDING CRITICAL HEALTH
CARE SERVICES TO PATIENTS WITH
ACUTE CORONARY SYNDROME
Robert Steinbucht
INTRODUCTION
Heart attacks are the number one killer in the United States.' Each
year about 1.2 million Americans suffer from heart attacks, and
approximately 500,000 die as a result.2 Consumers of emergency
medical care for symptoms of possible heart attacks, a.k.a. Acute
Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Wil-
liam H. Bowen School of Law; J.D. from, and John M. Olin Law and Economics
Fellow at, Columbia Law School; former Counsel to the United States Senate Judici-
ary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer
Rights; and current Member of the Board of Trustees of the Society of Chest Pain
Centers. The Society is a non-profit international organization focused upon improv-
ing care for patients with acute coronary syndromes and other maladies. The Society
is the only organization entitled to certify medical facilities as Accredited Chest Pain
Centers. Professor Steinbuch is the only non-medical-care professional or non-
scientist serving on the Board of Trustees of the Society and the only attorney on the
Board. The Society refers eponymously to the single most common symptom of heart
attacks - chest pain. See AM. HEART ASS'N., HEART ATTACK SYMPTOMS AND
WARNING SIGNS, http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtmil?identifier=4595.
1 AM. HEART ASS'N, ACUTE CORONARY SYNDROME, WHAT IS ACuTE
CORONARY SYNDROME?, http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=30
10002
2 RETAVASE, PRODUCT FACT SHEET, http://www.pdl.cotn/documents/
RetavaseFactSheet.pdf (pharmaceutical company fact sheet for prescription medi-
cation Retavase, which is designed to help prevent heart attacks); AM. HEART ASS'N,
HEART ATTACK AND ANGINA STATISTICS, http://www.americanheart.org/
presenter.jhtml?identifier=4591 (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
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Coronary Syndrome (ACS), 3 suffer from both over- and under-
regulation, resulting in two market imperfections: (1) over-regulation
results in heart attack patients transported by ambulances being taken
to the closest, rather than the appropriately-equipped, facilities; (2)
under-regulation results in heart attack patients who are seeking
emergency medical care on their own being faced with misleading
hospital advertising that results in the provision of sub-optimal care.
Both of these imperfections lead to the inefficient allocation of limited
health care resources, resulting in a reduction in social wealth.
Given these market and regulatory failures, this Article discusses
why the current regulatory model should be abandoned in favor of a
paradigm in which (1) heart attack patients transported to hospitals by
emergency medical services are directed to the best-equipped facili-
ties, allowing for the maximization of both patient care and facility
compensation; and (2) the manner in which medical facilities are per-
mitted to advertise their capabilities to address ACS is regulated so as
to ensure that information asymmetries between health care providers
and consumers do not distort the market for optimal health care.
The Article is divided into five parts. This introductory section
has briefly presented the significant impact of heart attacks on Ameri-
can health care and the need for better regulation of its treatment. Part
I presents the medical issues involved in ACS; it focuses on the time-
sensitive nature of heart attacks and the specific means to address
these acute events. Part II analyzes the economic causes and effects of
regulatory inefficiencies in the provision of heart attack care. Part Id
proposes solutions to these problems, including providing proposed
statutory language for enactment. Finally, the Article presents some
concluding thoughts.
I. TREATING ST-ELEVATED MYOCARDIAL
INFARCTIONS
A "heart attack" describes the permanent tissue damage-should
it occur-caused by ACS. The critical type of ACS leading to a heart
attack4 is defined by a blockage in an artery to the heart that needs to
be opened.5 The blockage typically occurs when blood clots around an
3 ACS refers to any group of clinical symptoms compatible with insufficient
blood supply to the heart. Patients who have symptoms of ACS are given an electro-
cardiogram (ECG). An ECG provides a graph of the heartbeat, with different portions
labeled P, Q, R, S and T. AM. HEART ASS'N, AcuTE CORONARY SYNDROME, supra
note 1.
4 Id.
5 Ellen C. Keeley et al., Primary Angioplasty Versus Intravenous Throm-
[Vol. 17:17
2007] REGULATING INEFFICIENCIES IN CARDIAC HEALTH CARE 19
eruptive plaque injury inside a blood vessel feeding the heart.6 These
blockage-caused heart attacks uniquely create a rise in the "ST" seg-
ment on the ECG and are known as ST-elevated myocardial infarc-
tions-STEMIs.7
When a patient suffers from this blockage-caused heart attack,
doctors must quickly intervene and open the obstructed artery (reper-
fusion therapy); 8 the longer the delay in treatment, the dramatically
less effective the procedure becomes. 9 The failure to promptly diag-
nose and care for these treatable heart attacks increases the damage to
heart muscle of, and the likelihood of death to, these patients.10
Doctors can open the blocked blood vessels causing these heart
attacks by threading a balloon-tipped catheter through an artery of the
patient's leg, or less commonly the arm, to the heart; when at the point
of the obstruction, doctors inflate and deflate the balloon to crush the
blockage against the wall of the artery-thus, reopening the artery.1 '
This process is known as Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI).12
bolytic Therapy for Acute Myocardial Infarction: A Quantitative Review of 23 Ran-
domised Trials, 361 LANCET 13, 13 (2003); The Best Treatment Most Heart Victims
Aren't Getting: Drugs More Likely to Be Used Over Angioplasty Procedure,
CNN.com, Oct. 10, 2003, http://www.cnn.coml2003/HEALTHIconditions/10/10/
heart.attacks.ap/ [hereinafter Best Treatment].
6 Gregg W. Stone & Bernard J. Gersh, Facilitated Angioplasty: Paradise
Lost, 367 LANCET 543, 543 (2006).
7 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., BEST HEALTH, HEART CENTER, CORONARY
ARTERY DISEASE (CAD), http://www.usnews.com/usnews/health/heart/cad/cad.about
.htm.
8 See Francis M. Fesmire et al., Clinical Policy: Critical Issues in the
Evaluation and Management of Adult Patients with Non-ST-Segment Elevation Acute
Coronary Syndromes, 48 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 270, 278 (2006); Elizabeth H.
Bradley et al., Achieving Door-to-Balloon Times That Meet Quality Guidelines: How
Do Successful Hospitals Do It?, 46 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1236, 1236 (2005).
9 Bradley et al., supra note 8, at 1236.
10 Lawrence K. Altman, New Therapy Appears Capable of Stopping Heart
Attack's Progress, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1982, at Cl; Keeley et al., supra note 5, at
13; Best Treatment, supra note 5.
11 SOCIETY FOR VASCULAR SURGERY, VASCULARWEB, PATIENT AND FAMILY
HEALTH INFORMATION, ANGIOPLASTY AND STENTING, http://www.vascularweb.org/
_CONTRIBUTION PAGES/PatientInformation/NorthPoint/Angioplasty-and
_Stenting.html; Keeley et al., supra note 5, at 13.
12 This process is commonly known as, inter alia, catheterization or coronary
angioplasty. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HEART LUNG
AND BLOOD INSTITUTE, DISEASES AND CONDITIONS INDEX, ANGIOPLASTY: OTHER
NAMES FOR CORONARY ANGIOPLASTY, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/
Angioplasty/AngioplastyOtherNames.html (defining coronary angioplasty as syn-
onymous with PCI); TEXAS HEART INSTITUTE, DIAGNOSTIC TESTS: CARDIAC
CATHETERIZATION (2006), http://www.texasheartinstitute.org/HIC/Topics/Diag/dicath
.cfm (referring to the PCI procedure as cardiac catheterization and providing informa-
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In the alternative, doctors can administer clot-busting (fibrinolytic' 3)
drugs. 14 The goal of both treatments is the same-to unblock the ar-
tery and stop the brutal and irreparable damage to the patient's heart.' 5
Recent data confirms PCI as the optimal treatment for all patients
with acute heart blockages,' 6 because patients undergoing PCI have
fewer complications, lower mortality rates, and improved post-
treatment results when compared to similarly situated patients receiv-
ing fibrinolytics.17 Simply put, "[t]here is no question that primary
PCI, when available, is the treatment of choice."
' 18
tion on the catheterization process). Medical literature also refers to this same proce-
dure as percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA). Keeley et al., supra
note 5, at 13. Angiograms or diagnostic catheterizations, in contrast to therapeutic
catheterizations, simply allow the cardiologist to view the inside of the coronary
vessels and the heart for possible future intervention. U.S. NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED. &
NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, MEDLINE PLUS, MED. ENCYCLOPEDIA, CARDIAC
CATHETERIZATION (2006), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003419
.htm (defining "cardiac catheterization").
13 Also referred to in the literature as "thrombolytic." See Cindy L. Grines et
al., Fibrinolytic Therapy: Is It a Treatment of the Past?, 107 CIRCULATION: J. AM.
HEART ASS'N 2538, 2538 (2003).
14 Altman, supra note 10, at CI (clot busting drug approved by the Food and
Drug Administration for use in treating heart attack patients in 1982); see Peter
Moyer et al., Implications of the Mechanical (PCI) vs Thrombolytic Controversy for
ST Segment Elevation Myocardial Infarction on the Organization of Emergency
Medical Services: The Boston EMS Experience, 3 CRITICAL PATHWAYS IN
CARDIOLOGY 53, 55 (2004).
15 Best Treatment, supra note 5.
16 Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 54; Best Treatment, supra note 5.
17 A meta-analysis of 10 randomized trials conducted through 1997 showed
marked superiority of primary angioplasty versus thrombolytic therapy: mortality at
30 days was a relative 34 percent lower: 4.4 percent versus 6.5 percent (P - 0.02.18).
The combination of either death or reinfarction was also significantly reduced by a
relative 42 percent: 7.2 percent versus 11.9 percent (P _0.001), an absolute 4.7 per-
cent reduction in events. With regard to safety, total stroke was significantly reduced
by a relative 65 percent: 0.7 percent versus 2.0 percent (P _ 0.007), and, most strik-
ingly, intracranial hemorrhage was reduced by 93 percent: 0.07 percent versus 1.1
percent (P - 0.001). On the basis of this meta-analysis, primary PCI, as performed in
these trials, was clearly superior to thrombolytic therapy.
Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 55; see Fesmire et al., supra note 8, at 272-73; Chris-
topher P. Cannon, Primary Percutaneous Coronary Intervention for All?, 287 JAMA
1987, 1987 (2002); Keeley et al., supra note 5, at 13.
18 Grines et al., supra note 13, at 2538.
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II. ACS PATIENTS ARE DIRECTED TO SUB-
OPTIMAL CARE AS A RESULT OF OUTDATED OR
INSUFFICIENT REGULATION, DEPENDING ON THE
MODE BY WHICH THEY ENTER THE SYSTEM FOR
THE PROVISION OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE
Less than twenty-five percent of American hospitals have PCI ca-
pability.' 9 However, nearly eighty percent of Americans live within
one hour's drive of a facility that performs PCI. 20 Those facilities are
close enough to provide the time-sensitive advanced care that heart
attack patients require, 2' but patients must get to those facilities. Thus,
the dilemma becomes transporting patients undergoing treatable heart
attacks (STEMIs) to the right facility, i.e., a PCI-capable facility.22
Patients that suffer from possible heart attacks can be divided into
two groups based on how they arrive at the hospital. ACS patients can
come to hospitals seeking emergency care either by: (1) being trans-
ported by EMS (EMS-transported patients), or (2) walking in or being
brought in by a family member or friend (walk-in patients). Both of
these means of entering the system for the provision of emergency
medical care for ACS patients often result in patients being directed to
under-equipped hospitals.
In the case of EMS-transported patients, outdated regulations di-
rect patients to the closest facility rather than PCI-capable institu-
19 Ronald G. McKay, Evolving Strategies in the Treatment of Acute Myocar-
dial Infarction in the Community Hospital, 42 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 642, 642
(2003).
20 Brahmajee K. Nallamothu et al., Driving Times and Distances to Hospitals
with Percutaneous Coronary Intervention in the United States: Implications for Pre-
hospital Triage of Patients with ST-Elevation Myocardial Infarction, 113
CIRCULATION: J. AM. HEART Ass'N 1189, 1191 (2006); Best Treatment, supra note 5.
21 Patients should receive PCI within ninety minutes of symptom onset.
RETAVASE, supra note 2.
22 See ANGIOPLASTY.ORG, HEART ATTACK AND ANGIOPLASTY, PRIMARY
ANGIOPLASTY IN TREATMENT OF ACUTE MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION (HEART ATTACK),
http://www.ptca.org/ptca-ami.html (stating that a patient "with treatable MI should
try and get to a hospital that can perform angioplasty" because it will greatly improve
the patient's chances of survival).
23 "Walk-in patients" include both those who walk in and those brought in by
others. In actuality, there is also another group of patients who "arrive" at hospitals
with STEMIs. These are in-hospital patients who suffer heart attacks while already
admitted. If these patients are in non-PCI-capable facilities, they suffer from the same
inefficiencies as those in the EMS model, although, at least intuitively, the risk that
the community hospital will delay, or fail to, transfer them to a fully-equipped institu-
tion appears even higher.
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tions.24 Thus, proximity becomes compensated over capability, and
patients often receive sub-optimal care.
For walk-in patients, unregulated hospitals exploit informational
asymmetries to attract these customers by falsely advertising the abil-
ity to treat heart attacks, impeding the efficient market direction of
resources. This allocative inefficiency results in: (1) heart attack pa-
tients, as a cohort, receiving sub-optimal care; (2) PCI-capable facili-
ties receiving insufficient compensation; and (3) non-PCI-capable
facilities both seeking and improperly garnering economic rents.
A. Current Regulatory Inefficiencies in the Provision of Emergency
Transportation to Heart Attack Patients Result in Insufficient
Incentives for Improvements in the Quality of Treatment and
Sub-Optimal Care
In most jurisdictions, when an ambulance encounters heart attack
patients, these patients are transported to the closest facility regardless
of capability. 25 Directing heart attack patients to the closest facility is
an historical vestige of pre-PCI technology. 6 Prior to the relatively
recent advent of angioplasty, the treatment for ACS was modest, con-
sisting of morphine to control pain and reduce anxiety, diet restriction,
and anticoagulant-drug therapy, i.e., anti-clotting drugs that behave
27similarly to aspirin. As such, directing patients to the closest facility
24 Thomas M. Burton, Fatal Blockages: Stroke Victims Are Often Taken to
Wrong Hospital - Outdated Ambulance Rules, Inadequate ERs Make Dangerous
Ailment Worse - Lessons From Trauma Centers, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2005, at Al.
25 Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 53-54. See SuSAN ATHEY & SCOTT STERN,
THE ADOPTION AND IMPACT OF ADVANCED EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICES 63 (1998)
(showing typical EMS protocol to divert trauma patients to designated trauma centers,
with no such explicit protocol for cardiac patients - although some cardiac patients
are taken to trauma centers, as patients with the most severe indications in Pennsyl-
vania, for example, are to be transported to hospitals with "appropriate capabilities";
otherwise patients are taken to the closest facility), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/
retrieve/2320/SWP-4007-40963055.pdf. The lack of black-line protocols for cardiac
patients comparable to the system for trauma patients results in too many cardiac
patients being brought to the default closest facility. Absent these default regulations
and protocols, ambulances and emergency medical services might be more likely to
choose to direct patients to more distant facilities; moreover, regulations to the con-
trary, as proposed here, to direct cardiac patients to cardiac facilities, would result in
far greater numbers of patients being brought to the highest-care facility. Unfortu-
nately, the ground-breaking EMTALA statute appears to offer no assistance on this
issue either, as it is focused on the opposite problem. Specifically, EMTALA ad-
dresses patient "dumping," where patients are refused entrance to a hospital - not
where patients are inappropriately selected by hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2007).
26 Best Treatment, supra note 5.
27 See AM. COLL. OF CARDIOLOGY, ISCHEMIC HEART DISEASE, http://www.acc
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was prudent due to the uniformity in treatment delivered by all institu-
tions. Proximity resulted in the expeditious provision of the then-latest
"technology"-albeit limited at best. Transportation to distant facili-
ties wasted patient and EMS time and resources.
Today, in contrast, the rational heart attack patient-the con-
sumer-most values the availability of the latest technology to ad-
dress the ACS, i.e., PCI-capability to address a possible STEMI. If the
provision of emergency medical care were an ordinary market-
directed service, PCI-capable facilities would be rewarded when pa-
tients chose to go to those better-equipped facilities (and the attendant
insurance compensated those institutions). Those facilities would
flourish economically. The under-equipped facilities, in contrast,
would either wither commensurately or be forced to obtain compara-
28ble technology toremain competitive.
Both outcomes benefit patients by providing for increased access
to the appropriate level of technology. If under-equipped facilities
obtain competitive technology, by definition, they no longer will be
under-equipped. If, however, under-equipped facilities cannot com-
pete, they will cease operating. This will result in patients (and their
remuneration) being directed to the remaining fully-equipped facili-
ties. Thus, resources become channeled to their highest use, thereby
improving patient care.
1. Hospitals Seek Out and Do Not Transfer Chest Pain Patients Due
to the Lucrative Nature of Acute Coronary Syndrome
Under the current system for heart attack care, patients directed to
sub-optimal facilities would benefit from improved care upon prompt
.org/media/patient/chd/ischemic.htm (using a case study to articulate typical care for a
heart attack patient in 1949 in contrast to current treatments).
28 See ATHEY & STERN, supra note 25, at 12 (allocation of hospitals will
affect the incentives of hospitals to adopt various technologies); cf Howard Beales et
al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & EcON. 491, 492
(1981) (competition on quality increases consumer welfare). However, this is not to
say that an alternative outcome is not possible. Indeed, many public health theorists
are critical of those hospitals that focus on the high-dollar illnesses such as heart care.
See Steven Pearlstein, Free-Market Philosophy Doesn't Always Work for Health
Care, WASH. POST, June 8, 2005, at DI. The concern is that if patients with heart
attacks are directed to dedicated heart centers or heart hospitals, then the remaining
institutions will be forced to compete for the less lucrative patients. Id. These hospi-
tals may not survive, and the result could be excellent heart care at top-level heart
centers and no care for other conditions. Id. This is a legitimate public health concern.
However, from the perspective of both cardiac patient and cardiac health care pro-
vider, directing patients to the specialty facility is optimal, the broader health care
issues notwithstanding.
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transfer to PCI-facilities. These patients, however, must rely on the
sub-optimal facilities themselves to initiate transfer. This often does
not occur due to the under-equipped hospitals', a.k.a. community hos-
pitals, economic incentive to obtain and retain these ACS patients.
Hospitals, like other businesses, seek out revenue and are biased
towards maximizing income. 29 These financially motivated business
decisions are not necessarily consistent with the best interests of pa-
tients. 30 Since "Medicare pays generously for cardiac care," 31 and
Medicare payments are not intended to encourage hospitals and doc-
32tors to coordinate care with other institutions, community hospitals
often seek out and keep treatable heart attack patients rather than
transferring them.
33
Economic modeling predicts this outcome. Total compensation
(CP) for the treatment of a heart attack patient can be viewed as a
function of four variables: (1) compensation for initial screening and
basic treatment (IS); (2) compensation for PCI (PC); (3) compensation
for fibrinolytics, i.e., clot-busters (CB); and (4) compensation for
longer-term observation and symptomatic treatment resulting from at
least partially unsuccessful treatment of the underlying blockage
29 Anthony Joseph, The Chest Pain Center as an Operational Model, 3
CRITICAL PATHWAYS IN CARDIOLOGY 14, 14-17 (2004); James F. Blumstein & Frank
A. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition
What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849, 852-53 (1981); see Peggy
Peck, Medicare Will Pay for tPA in Stroke Thrombolysis, MEDPAGE TODAY, Aug. 4,
2005, http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy/MedicaidMedicare/tb/14
89.
30 Cf Shelley Wood, Want 90-Minute Door-to-Balloon Times? Here's How,
THE HEART.ORG, Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.theheart.org/article/650979.do (listing
eight common themes associated with improved delay time, and imply significantly
increased spending on each patient); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219-20
(2000).
31 Reed Abelson, Generous Medicare Payments Spur Specialty Hospital
Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at Al.
32 Id. at 20 (citing "Dr. Gerard F. Anderson, a former federal health official
who helped develop the [current Medicare] system and now teaches at the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health").
33 See Burton, supra note 24 ("[Community] hospitals have resisted move-
ment toward a system of specialized stroke centers because nondesignated institutions
could lose business. . . . 'There are still very parochial interests by hospitals and phy-
sicians to keep patients locally even if they're not equipped to handle them,' says
neurosurgeon Robert A. Solomon."); cf, Robert Steinbuch, The Executive-
Internalization Approach to High-Risk Corporate Behavior: Establishing Individual
Criminal Liability for the Intentional or Reckless Introduction of Excessively Danger-
ous Products or Services into the Stream of Commerce, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y (forthcoming 2007) (discussing how financial motivations can outweigh deci-
sion-makers' consideration of health and safety issues).
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causing the heart attack (ObSv). 34 Thus, the total revenue for the
treatment of heart attacks across institutions can be characterized as
Z(IS + PC + CB + ObSv).
Since PC and CB are typically mutually exclusive variables, a fa-
cility will receive either PC or CB but not both. PC is greater than CB,
but the underlying service (PCI) requires significantly greater capital
and labor costs. 35 Additionally, ObSrv is inversely related to PC and
CB, although the relationship is not 1:1. That is, while facilities re-
ceive PC or CB based on whether the underlying services are pro-
vided, the failure of those services to fully address the heart attack (or
the failure to provide the services comprising those variables at all)
determines whether the patient will need the services providing com-
pensation for the ObSrv variable.
Since percutaneous coronary intervention is successful approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of the time, and fibrinolytics are only suc-
cessful approximately fifty-five percent of the time,36 the probability
of the ObSrv variable in the CP formula can be further refined and
separated for PCI (CP.PCI) and non-PCI (CP.NPCI) facilities provid-
ing services to heart attack patients by introducing "p" to represent the
probability of successful intervention:
CP.PCI = IS + PC + p(ObSv), where p < 37CP.NPCI = IS + GB + p(ObSv), where p < .45.38
Thus, while both PCI and non-PCI facilities both earn comparable
revenue through IS, the remaining variables are in contrast. PCI facili-
ties generally earn their revenue through successful PCI and rapid
discharge (high PC, low ObSv). Non-PCI facilities earn their revenue
from partially-successful fibrinolytic therapy, augmented through
significant observation (low CB, high ObSv). Accordingly, while
34 See ELLIOTT M. ANTMAN ET AL., ACC/AHA GUIDELINES FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF PATIENTS WITH ST-ELEVATION MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION: A
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF CARDIOLOGY/AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON PRACTICE GUIDELINES (COMMITTEE TO REVISE THE 1999 GUIDELINES
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF PATIENTS WITH ACUTE MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION) e82-e85
(2004), available at http://www.acc.org/qualityandscience/clinical/guidelines/steni/
Guideline 1/index.pdf.
35 PCI generally costs between $20,000 and $30,000. Tim Bonfield, Heart
Attack Strategy: Fast Care - Angioplasty Project Skips Transfer Time, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, June 28, 2004, at ]A. Fibrolynics cost about $2,000, and Medicare in-
creases payment for patient treatment with these drugs by $6000. Peck, supra note 29.
36 Bonfield, supra note 35.
37 p is less than .05 because some patients die.
38 p is less than .45 because some patients die.
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CB/patient is less than PC/patient, (CB + p(ObSv))/patient will be
closer to (and may even surpass) (PC + p(ObSv))/patient.
This profit-seeking model has proven lucrative for non-PCI facili-
ties when, as is currently the case, competitive market forces are re-
moved through the regulatorily-mandated direction of heart attack
patients to these sub-optimal facilities.
"There is no incentive to change . . . . The small hospitals
don't want to divert patients to larger hospitals, because that is
lost revenue."
Heart attack treatment, in fact, is one of the most profitable
hospital services. While more could add primary angioplasty
[i.e., PCI] to their repertoires, most will not, because building
and staffing the labs is too expensive.39
Thus, even though adding PCI-facilities would allow community
hospitals to market this significantly enhanced ability, they have gen-
erally found it more advantageous not to add this capability,
40
because, under the current regulatory scheme that mandates patient
direction to sub-optimal facilities, there is little need for any market-
ing distinction at all.4'
Further, once community hospitals take in heart attack patients,
under current reimbursement policies, they have a direct economic
disincentive to transfer these lucrative customers to PCI-capable fa-
cilities.42 Indeed, community hospitals are structured to hold onto
39 Best Treatment, supra note 5 (quoting Dr. Cindy Grines of William
Beaumont Hospital is suburban Detroit).
40 See Sue Hughes, Speeding up the Treatment of MI: Is Prehospital Throm-
bolysis or Expanded Primary PCI the Answer?, THEHEART.ORG, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.theheart.org/article/385813.do.
41 See infra note 66 (describing how the cohort of patients transported by
ambulance, which accounts for approximately half of the patients in need of PCI,
have no say regarding the facility to which they are transported; as discussed below,
the other half, which is self-transported, has a choice, but it is often irrational due to
informational asymmetries).
42 Cf Lisa Nainggolan, High-Risk ACS Patients Least Likely to be Trans-
ferred, THEHEART.ORG, March 17, 2004, http://www.theheart.org/article/220451.do
(indirectly implying that patients who are high risk are more likely to die before or
during the procedure and, thus, are not as financially lucrative as healthier patients
who survive the procedure and require continuing care); Richard E. Waters II et al.,
Rationale and Strategies for Implementing Community-Based Transfer Protocols for
Primary Percutaneous Coronary Intervention for Acute ST-Segment Elevation Myo-
cardial Infarction, 43 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 2153, 2157 (2004); see also Best Treat-
ment, supra note 5; Sharon Salyer, Heart Attack Strategy Changes, Oct. 13, 2003,
http://www.heraldnet.com/Stories/03/10/13/17605065.cfm.
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these heart attack patients-allowing the sub-optimal facilities to
maximize the revenue they obtain through the ObSv variable.43
For example, one study showed that almost half of the ACS pa-
tients who went to community hospitals were never even seen by a
cardiologist-greatly increasing the likelihood that these patients
would never be transferred to PCI-capable facilities." Additionally,
based on this financial incentive, community hospitals may also fail to
transfer a disproportionately large percentage of the older and sicker
ACS patients.45 Instead, these patients typically stay in the hospital
until they die (incurring significant charges along the way).46 Indeed,
given the success rate of fibrinolytics, when administered, the typical
post-heart attack hospital stay for approximately half of the heart at-
tack patients treated in community hospitals is six weeks47-resulting
in the high ObSv factor predicted above.
This very concern about financial disincentives for community
hospitals to transfer heart attack patients to optimal treatment facilities
(PCI-capable) recently has been raised by seven U.S. Senators in a
letter to leading heart-health organizations: "We have seen some
situations where STEMI patients were ruled out for transfer [by com-
munity hospitals] to a PCI-equipped facility .... We are concerned
about the possibility that patients are being refused a transfer to a
higher level facility for inappropriate reasons, such as a financial in-
centive or insufficient skill. 48
43 Cf Bonfield, supra note 35; Nainggolan, supra note 42; see also Waters et
al., supra note 42, at 2157.
44 Nainggolan, supra note 42; cf Waters et al., supra note 42, at 2154-57
(noting that PCI-capable facilities "have lower mortality rates and improved proce-
dural outcomes"); see also Best Treatment, supra note 5 (noting that small hospitals
usually lack angioplasty services).
45 Cf Waters et al., supra note 42, at 2157 (noting the financial incentive not
to transfer heart attack patients); Best Treatment, supra note 5.
46 Cf Waters et al., supra note 42, at 2157.
,47 Cf NAT'L INSTS OF HEALTH, HEARTMEMO, 50 YEARS OF PROGRESS IN
HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD RESEARCH: NHLBI CELEBRATES ITS GOLDEN
ANNIVERSARY 1 (1997).
48 Letter from Arlen Specter, US. Senator (R-Pa.), Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., John McCain, U.S. Senator (R-Ariz.), Chairman of the Senate
Commerce Comm., Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), U.S. Senator, Herb Kohl (D-Wis.),
Member of the Special Comm. on the Aging, Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), Chairman of
the Ret., Security, and Aging Subcomm. of the Comm. of Health, Educ., Labor and
Pensions, Mary L. Landrieu (D-La.), Member of the Cong. Heart & Stroke Caucus,
and Orin G. Hatch (R-Utah), Member of the Cong. Heart & Stroke Caucus, Former
Chairman, and current member of, Comm. of Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions,
Ranking Republican on the Fin., Judiciary, and Intelligence Comms., to the Am.
Heart Ass'n and The Am. Coll. of Cardiology (May 31, 2005), available at http://
www.scpcp.org/media/files/senators.pdf.
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2. Rent Seeking
This positive model of community hospitals seeking out and re-
taining the lucrative ACS patients is further supported by evidence of
rent seeking, and the concomitant deadweight losses, by sub-optimal
facilities desiring to maintain their inefficient market share. 49 Unsur-
prisingly, the very same rent seeking by community hospitals has
been observed in the context of their resistance to the diversion of
other acute patients to specially-equipped facilities.
For example, many community hospitals also seek out stroke pa-
tients rather than having them diverted to institutions with advanced
stroke capabilities. 50 Indeed, medically, strokes and heart attacks are
virtually identical acute events. The devastating effects of both make
them two of the three most critical health care problems facing
Americans today: while heart attacks are the primary killer of Ameri-
cans, 51 strokes constitute the number one cause of disabilities and the
third cause of death in the United States. 52 The treatments for both
acute ailments are similar53 and based on the fact that most strokes
and heart attacks share the same cause-a blockage in a blood vessel
to the respective organ, i.e., the brain and heart, respectively, that re-
stricts the flow of blood.54 If these blockages can be addressed
quickly, patients' prognoses are positive; delays in treatment almost
invariably disable or kill.55
49 See Best Treatment, supra note 5; Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 57.
50 [Community] hospitals have resisted movement toward a system of spe-
cialized stroke centers because nondesignated institutions could lose business....
'There are still very parochial interests by hospitals and physicians to keep
patients locally even if they're not equipped to handle them," says neurosur-
geon Robert A. Solomon....
"We have the same political crap as in most communities. Paramedics still
take people to the local ER, [which may not be the best-equipped facility]."
Burton, supra note 24.
51 AM. HEART Ass'N, ACUTE CORONARY SYNDROME, supra note 1.
52 Burton, supra note 24; see also Ohio State University Medical Center,
Statistics of Strokes, http://medicalcenter.osu.edu/patientcare/healthinformation/
diseasesandconditions/stroke/statistics/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2006) (strokes kill more
than 275,000 Americans each year).
53 See AM. HEART ASS'N, HEART AND STROKE FACTS 19-20, 52 (2003).
4 See id. at 19-20, 43-46, 52.
55 See Giuseppe De Luca et al., Relation of Interhospital Delay and Mortality
in Patients with ST-Segment Elevation Myocardial Infarction Transferred for Pri-
mary Coronary Angioplasty, 95 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1361, 1361-63 (2005); cf.
Burton, supra note 24 (describing same issue for stroke patients); cf. Ohio State Uni-
versity Medical Center, Healthcare Services, Interventional Neuroradiology,
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3. Delay in Treatment from Non-Direct Transport to PCI Facilities
Financial incentives do not fully determine all outcomes regarding
the transfer of heart attack patients from community hospitals to PCI-
capable institutions. Thus, some heart attack patients in need of inter-
vention do get transferred from ill-equipped facilities to PCI-capable
institutions for PCI. Even when transferred, however, these patients
wait nearly twice as long to receive the necessary time-critical treat-
ment than those who are transported directly to the PCI-capable facil-
ity.56 This outcome is predictable and recognized in medical
literature,57 as the duplication of efforts must result in delay.58 That is,
if a patient is treated at a sub-optimal facility that ultimately decides to
transfer her, the transferring facility will only do so after performing
the necessary tests (at the minimum, an ECG and a blood analysis for
cardiac enzyme markers),. 9 Upon transfer, even with proper notifica-
tion from the transferring facility, the receiving facility will often
repeat some of these tests before sending the patient to the catheteriza-
tion laboratory for PCI. To rely on another facility's diagnosis would
be irresponsible and could expose the receiving facility to a claim of
malpractice should an injury occur.60 By bringing the patient directly
to the PCI-capable facility, this inefficiency is eliminated.6' Moreover,
http://medicalcenter.osu.edu/patientcare/hospitaisandservices/programs/services/index
.cfm?ID=306 (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
56 "If transferred from [a community hospital], the average heart attack pa-
tient [had to wait] about 198 minutes before undergoing PCI, compared to" a 107-
minute wait for heart attack patients brought directly to hospitals that perform PCI.
ALICE K. JACOBS ET AL., AM. HEART Ass'N, MEETING REPORT 11/17/2002 -
EMERGENCY ANGIOPLASTY OK wrrHouT SURGICAL BACK-UP (2002), http://www
.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=3006674; see also McKay, supra note
19, at 642 ("Despite the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association
(ACC/AHA)-recommended door-to-balloon times of 90 ± 30 min, data on patients
treated with PCI in the National Registry of Myocardial Infarction (NRMI) indicate a
median treatment time delay of >2 h in 87 percent of patients transferred for mechani-
cal intervention." (footnotes omitted)).
57 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
58 De Luca et al., supra note 55, at 1362-63; cf. Burton, supra note 24,
(describing same issue for stroke patients).
59 Each one of these factors adds a delay in transfer and treatment time even
when done promptly. Further, potential heart attack patients typically do not timely
receive the time-critical ECGs necessary for proper diagnoses. Sue Hughes, ECG
Time Targets Not Being Met in Chest-Pain Patients, THE HEART.ORG, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.theheart.org/article/645527.do. The ECG is typically the first test given to
determine if a patient is experiencing a heart attack and often determines what treat-
ment option is pursued - including whether to perform PCI. AM. HEART ASS'N, supra
note 2.
60 Cf Hughes, supra note 40.
61 Cf Ellen J. MacKenzie et al., National Inventory of Hospital Trauma
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once the sub-optimal facility decides to transfer, yet another delay
occurs-that associated with waiting for an ambulance to transfer the
patient; this delay is often the longest in this dysfunctional process.62
Accordingly, the critical public health concern with existing regu-
lations is that (1) they prevent potential market forces from influenc-
ing and improving the provision of emergency medical care for
ACS,63 and (2) they are not self-updating to reflect inevitable ad-
vances in medical science. Now that medicine indeed has changed, the
existing regulatory scheme needs to change accordingly.
B. The Failure to Regulate Asymmetric Information for Walk-In
Patients Also Results in Inefficient and Sub-Optimal Care
Paradoxically, to the extent that patients choose health care facili-
ties during possible heart attacks, i.e., when being transported by
means other than EMS, they are prevented from making informed
decisions. The absence of regulation allows under-equipped health
care providers to exploit consumers,' i.e., patients,' inherent informa-
tional asymmetries. Thus, given that chest pain is the number two
reason for all emergency room visits, 64 community hospitals have
discovered that by self-designating as "Chest Pain Centers" or the
like, without any PCI capability whatsoever, they can misdirect pa-
tients from fully-capable hospitals to their sub-optimal facilities. The
result is that: (1) heart attack patients, as a cohort, obtain sub-optimal
care; (2) PCI-capable facilities receive sub-optimal compensation; and
(3) non-PCI-capable facilities both seek and improperly garner eco-
nomic rents.
For example, one hospital, Mather Hospital in New York, sends
flyers to all households in the community advertising its "Chest Pain
Emergency Room" and the ability to "stop a heart attack in progress,"
notwithstanding the absence of PCI-capability; Mather boasts the fol-
lowing "upgrades" to assist in the care of heart attack and other pa-
Centers, 289 JAMA 1515, 1521 (2003) ("[A]n initial evaluation of a severely injured
trauma patient at a lower level trauma center and [subsequent] transfer [of] the patient
to a higher level trauma center.., would result in time delays that could have delete-
rious effects on patient outcome." (footnotes omitted)).
62 Cf Hughes, supra note 40 (noting that "the longest delays are often
waiting for an ambulance to turn up to transfer a patient").
63 "[T]he American healthcare system (largest possible system) is no longer a
free enterprise system .... Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' of free market forces has
largely been replaced by the 'visible hand' of government." Joseph, supra note 29, at
15.
64 Lisa Nainggolan, Room for Improvement in Emergency Care of Chest
Pain, THE HEART.ORG, March 2, 2006, http://www.theheart.org/article/657443.do.
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tients: a cellular-phone system and a "state-of-the-art blood pressure
monitor.
65
This false advertising phenomenon is equally as important an is-
sue in the provision of emergency medical care to heart attack patients
as the regulatory misdirection of EMS-transported heart attack pa-
tients to non-PCI-capable facilities because fifty percent of heart at-
tack patients in need of PCI are brought to hospitals by means other
than EMS.6 6
While walk-in heart attack patients, clearly, are permitted to travel
to a PCI-capable facility, most do not even know what one is, no less
where one is located, due to informational asymmetries between hos-
pitals and patients. Ill-equipped community hospitals exploit consum-
ers' ignorance through advertising in order to seek out these heart
attack patients. If heart attack treatment were an ordinary service,
market forces would correct this information imbalance. Given the
emergency nature of heart attack treatments and the complexity of
medical science, however, the market does a poor job of filtering out
false advertising for the reasons described below. As a consequence,
the market for heart attack care cannot operate efficiently.67
1. Consumer's Rational Ignorance Regarding Health Care Services
Patients and their relatives typically are unaware of the specific
level and quality of treatment that facilities provide and the alterna-
tives at other facilities---even after having received treatment--due to
imperfect information.68 Treatment is often a "black box" to the medi-
cally uneducated due to the rational ignorance of potential patients
researching such issues ex ante. That is, it is generally irrational for
65 Help in a Hurry: When It's an Emergency - Should an Unexpected Injury
or Illness Occur, Turn to Mather Hospital, COMMUNrrY NEWS (John T. Mather
Memorial Hospital, Port Jefferson, N.Y.), Fall 2005, at 3; see infra p. 35.
66 Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 54. Research conducted explicitly for this
article shows that of 18,390 PCI-treatable heart attacks presenting in 160 hospitals
between 1997 and 2005, 8,834 were transported by EMS, and 9,556 were walk-in
patients. Others estimate that as many as seventy percent of heart attack victims drive
themselves to the hospital or are driven by relatives. Bonfield, supra note 35.
67 See Beales et al., supra note 28, at 492 (noting that a buyer's ability to
review information about price, quality, etc. encourages sellers to strive to improve
their performance).
68 See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND
EcONOMics 66 ("There are situations in which, at the time of a decision by a con-
sumer or producer, certain information cannot be known .... When information is
unavailable at any price, we say it is incomplete, but not imperfect .... When infor-
mation could be obtained, but there is a significant cost to obtaining the information,
we say the information is imperfect.").
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ordinary consumers to investigate treatment options for ACS and the
availability of those options at relevant facilities because the cost of
obtaining and comprehending sufficient information is prohibitive.69
Most people will never need this treatment, and the complicated na-
ture of such medical information to a layperson is so great that the
investment of resources to evaluate it seems simply too high.7°
Post hoc analyses suffer from similar flaws. Heart attack patients
are not only equally uninformed as to the interventional technologies
available to treat frank heart attacks as potential patients in the ex-ante
situation above, but these ex-post patients also literally suffer from
post-heart attack infirmities-making them uniquely poor judges of
their own medical care.7 1 Given such informational limitations, these
under-treated heart attack patients cannot make the necessary com-
parative analysis to affect the future market for the provision of this
type of emergency medical care.72
Finally, for those heart attack patients that are brought to facilities
without interventional capabilities who die, the consumer is no longer
available to affect the future market for the provision of this medical
care. And the remaining relatives often suffer from the initially enu-
merated informational disparity coupled with a desire to believe that
they did everything that they could for their relatives. Thus, any hint
of poor care becomes suppressed by the relatives and lost on the part
of the patient.
2. Temporal Limitations on Acquiring and Processing Information
Coupled with Consumers' Assumption of Existing Regulation
As discussed, ACS does not afford patients ample time to evaluate
options for care absent previous investigation.73 Thus, a simple sign
69 See Loretta M. Kopelman, What Is Unique About the Doctor and Patient
Medical Encounter? A Moral and Economic Perspective, AM. J. BIoETHICs, Mar.-
Apr. 2006, at 85, 85-86.
70 See James F. Blumstein, Health Care Law and Policy: Whence and
Whither?, 14 HEALTH MATRIx 35, 38-39 (2004) (informational asymmetries and
incapacities prevent patients from exercising the control they would in a typical mar-
ket-based context); cf. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 9
(1957) (discussing imperfect consumer information); cf. HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL.,
ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 329-30 (2003) (discussing imperfect consumer
information).
71 M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55
STAN. L. REv. 919, 930 (2002).
72 See Beales et al., supra note 28, at 505.
71 Cf. id. at 509-10 ("[I]f consumers are imperfectly informed, even small
sellers can achieve a degree of informational market power over price, leading to
monopolistic rather than perfect competition. For example, because the bereaved
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advertising a facility as a "Chest Pain Center" is often sufficient to get
ACS patients to choose that particular facility over another. This, cou-
pled with many health care consumers' mistaken belief that medical
care facilities are already regulated in their ability to advertise their
capabilities to address ACS,74 results in the market overvaluing the
"information" provided by the self-designation of "Chest Pain Cen-
ter."
3. Insufficiency of Litigation as a Market-Correcting Device
Currently, institutions are liable for the inaccurate claims that they
make.75 If a patient seeks out a hospital's care based on its specific
advertising, and that advertising turns out to be misleading or false,
the injured party has a cause of action against that hospital.76
However, most cases settle, and settlements routinely require con-
fidentiality. As such, these cases do not distribute market-adjusting
information.77 Indeed, there are no published cases in which Chest
Pain Centers or the like were sued for false advertising; one unpub-
cannot easily shop among funeral homes, the industry is fragmented (each seller
averages only 100 funerals per year), and prices are high.").
74 Cf Letter from Joseph I. Boullata, Assoc. Professor of Pharmacy Practice,
Temple Univ. Sch. of Pharmacy, to the Food & Drug Admin. (Aug. 13, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/99n I 174/c000051 .pdf.
75 See, e.g., Smith v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 720 S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tex.
App. 1986) ("[Wlhen an institution purported to be a full-service hospital which
makes emergency room treatment available to serve the public, the hospital will be
estopped to deny that the physicians and other medical personnel on duty providing
treatment are its agents."); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980) ("[Dlespite the fact that a physician holds independent contractor
status with respect to a hospital, he may nonetheless be an agent of the hospital with
respect to the patient").
76 See, e.g., Creech v. Roberts, 908 F.2d 75, 76-80 (6th Cir. 1990) (Creech
heard about City of Faith Hospital through its "Expect a Miracle" advertising cam-
paign and sought treatment in the hospital. The court held that were it not for the
advertising campaign promising a miracle, plaintiff would not have traveled to the
City of Faith Hospital and would not have been injured in the fraudulent scheme
conducted by the hospital's doctors.); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health
Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 47-54 (Ohio 1994) (Plaintiffs daughter sought care at defen-
dant's emergency room after driving past a closer hospital because she had been
advised by her mother to seek treatment at defendant's hospital if she were ever sick.
The court discussed liability flowing from the following facts: plaintiff's mother had
been told by the hospital's administration department that the emergency room was
staffed by doctors twenty-four hours a day and was fully equipped; she also had be-
lieved, based on promotional literature, that the doctors were the employees of the
hospital because the information did not state otherwise.).
77 See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
27-32 (1998).
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lished case demonstrates that great efforts are taken by hospitals in
false advertising cases to ensure their confidentiality upon settle-
ment.78 More generally, the Supreme Court has noted that the judi-
ciary is not the right forum to determine whether doctors and hospitals
are properly evaluating the risk of rationing health care to increase
profits.79
C. Case Study of Community Hospital Care
80
The individual cases supporting the above economic analysis
abound. In one such case, the patient, Mark, had classic signs of a
heart attack--chest pain, difficulty breathing and dizziness.81 His
wife, Edna, immediately called the ambulance. Eight minutes later,
when the ambulance arrived, Edna requested to go to the fully
equipped local university hospital that Mark had been to before. The
ambulance crew refused and took Mark to a community hospital that
may have been a few minutes closer to his house. In addition, the
community hospital advertises itself as having a "Chest Pain Emer-
gency Room." The description is wholly self-designated.
Mark was having a heart attack. He needed PCI. This community
hospital, however, does not perform PCI, while the university hospital
does. The emergency room doctor at the community hospital did not
administer fibrinolytics and did not transfer Mark to the university
hospital for PCI. The cardiologist arrived at the community hospital
three hours after Mark. Again, no fibrinolytics were administered, and
Mark was not transferred to the university hospital.82 As such, the
78 See Roberts v. Lederman, No. 04-CV-00033, 2004 WL 2238564, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing the significant efforts by the parties to keep the sub-
stance of the settlement agreement confidential in litigation over false advertising by
hospital).
79 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221 (2000).
80 This case study is based on actual events. Copies of the medical records
are on file with this law journal.
81 Ohio State University Medical Center, Heart Attack, http://medical
center.osu.edu/patientcare/healthinformation/diseasesandconditions/heartdisease/heart
attack/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
82 Patients with treatable heart attacks should undergo PCI within ninety
minutes of arrival to the first hospital. ANTMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at e19, e25.
Thus, it follows that transfer from a non-PCI facility to a PCI-capable institution
needs to take place well before the expiration of this ninety-minute limit. In this case,
the cardiologist arrived not only after the optimal time to perform PCI, but well after
the time to transfer. This delay, however, inures to the community hospital's financial
benefit, as after a small time frame elapses, transfer is useless. Thus, community
hospitals have no incentive to correct these delays. Indeed, their incentive is to en-
courage and exploit these delays. Moreover, if a decision to transfer is made, the
cardiologist who can perform PCI at the receiving institution must be called. Since
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cardiologist effectively ruled out PCI for Mark-given the time limi-
tations of the procedure. Since ordinary cardiologists do not perform
angioplasty--only specially trained interventionalists at equipped
facilities perform angioplasty83-the community hospital's doctors
prevented care for which they were not trained and for which the hos-
pital could not provide. Several hours later, as a consequence of the
untreated heart attack, Mark suffered a stroke. Again no treatment was
provided.
Approximately eighteen hours after Mark arrived at the commu-
nity hospital, the cardiologist transferred Mark to the university hospi-
tal-far after any PCI could have been performed. 84 When the Chief
of Cardiology and the Chief of the Catheterization Lab at the univer-
sity hospital saw Mark, they both said that they would have performed
PCI had he arrived timely. Mark died at the university hospital as a
result of his heart attack. This series of events is not atypical.
III. RESPONSES TO THE MARKET FAILURES IN THE
TREATMENT OF HEART ATTACKS
As demonstrated, regulations restricting access to optimal critical
care and insufficient marketplace information to consumers result in
sub-optimal medical care for heart attack patients. Suggested below
are the solutions.
interventionalists in virtually all institutions are only in the facility during normal
business hours, this adds yet another delay before PCI can be performed. See David J.
Magid et al., Relationship Between Time of Day, Day of Week, Timeliness of Reperfu-
sion, and In-Hospital Mortality for Patients With Acute ST-Segment Elevation Myo-
cardial Infarction, 294 JAMA 803, 803 (2005) (sixty-eight percent of heart attack
patients in need of PCI are treated during off hours and experience significant delays
in PCI as a direct consequence); Press Release, Yale Univ., Heart-Attack Patients
Seeking After-Hours Care Experience Delay in Critical Treatment, available at
http://www.yale.edu/opa/newsr/05-08-16-02.all.html (Aug. 16, 2005).
83 Sidney C. Smith, Jr. et al., ACC/AHA Guidelines for Percutaneous Coro-
nary Intervention (Revision of the 1993 PTCA Guidelines): A Report of the American
College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Practice Guide-
lines (Committee to Revise the 1993 Guidelines for Percutaneous Transluminal Coro-
nary Antoplasty), 37 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 2239i, 2239xvii (2001).
See McKay, supra note 19, at 642.
85 Cf. Press Release, University of Virginia Health System, In Speed and
Quality, UVa's Emergency Cardiac Care Outpaces Goals of New Lifesaving Initiative
(Nov. 17, 2006), available at http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/intemet/news/
archives06/cardiaccare.cfm ("less than a third of STEMI patients receive treatment
within [the AHA-recommended] 90 minutes").
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A. Prioritizing Technology over Proximity: Direct Transport of Heart
Attack Patients to Percutaneous Coronary Intervention Equipped
Facilities-the Application of the Trauma Care Model to Heart
Attacks
In 1976, an orthopedic surgeon was flying his family in a private
plane. He crashed in Nebraska and his family was taken to a local
hospital. 86 The family received sub-standard care. As a consequence,
the orthopedist sought the help of his colleagues to correct this prob-
lem.87 These doctors realized that taking severely injured patients to
the nearest, rather than the best equipped, hospital could mean death.
So began the impetus to create specialized trauma centers and to
overhaul ambulance protocols so that paramedics would take the most
severely injured patients to those designated trauma centers.88 Today,
accident victims typically go directly to a trauma center--often by-
passing less capable facilities. 89 This has saved lives and decreased
disabilities resulting from accidents.90
By rewarding through compensation quality over proximity, the
market allowed for the significant expansion of the number of U.S.
trauma centers. 91 As of 2003, every state and the District of Columbia
had at least one trauma center, and thirty-five States had a formal
trauma care system.92 Indeed, studies show that trauma centers have
reduced the proportion of deaths in serious accidents judged prevent-
able by in excess of fifty percent.93 Similar proposals for directed
transport of stroke patients also have been made but not adopted. 94
The same approach for heart attack care-wherein heart attack pa-
tients are transported directly to hospitals with PCI facilities, even if
they are farther than other hospitals without such capabilities-will
save lives and reward with greater remuneration properly equipped
institutions. 95
86 AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, ADVANCED TRAUMA LIFE SUPPORT PROGRAM
FOR DOcTORs 11 (6th ed. 1997).
87 Id.
88 Burton, supra note 24.
89 AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, supra note 86, at 11.
90 Burton, supra note 24.
91 Waters et al., supra note 42, at 2153.
92 MacKenzie et al., supra note 61, at 1515-16.
13 Id. at 1515.
94 S. 1064, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); S. 1909, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
95 European countries have been more receptive to directed transport for
heart attack patients. See Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 53-55; H.R. Andersen et al.,
Myocardial Infarction Centres: The Way Forward, 91 HEART 12, 12 (2005).
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A few forward looking localities in America have adopted ad hoc,
through waivers of state regulation, small-scale pilot programs im-
plementing direct transport programs for heart attack patients:96 for
example, Broward County, Florida adopted such a program, and it has
shown dramatic success:
"In our community, this system has worked," says [Dr.] Bush.
"I know we are saving lives."
Elsewhere, though, patients typically get such treatment only
if they end up at an angioplasty hospital by chance.
"It's really wrong what's going on," says Dr. Barry Kaplan,
cath[eterization] lab director at New York's Long Island Jew-
ish Medical Center.97
As one commentator stated, the "[m]oral of the story [is that]...
[platients with treatable MI should try to get [directly] to a hospital
that can perform angioplasty. 98
Thus, the aforedescribed regulatorily-created market failure
should be replaced with the market mimicking approach suggested
herein. 99 America may have the world's best medical technology,10°
96 Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 53-55.
97 Best Treatment, supra note 5; Lisa Nainggolan, "Level-] Trauma"
Method Improves Outcomes in STEM! Patients, THE HEART.ORG, Nov. 8, 2004,
http://www.theheart.org/article/360873.do (local adoption of a directed care system
like the one suggested in this article significantly reduced the time patients had to wait
to undergo PCI). Of course, while localities could be left to correct this problem on
their own (either publicly or privately), such an approach will obviously be less effi-
cient and more time-consuming. The result would be that, in the meantime, patients
would continue to be misdirected for care - resulting in greater injury and death all
along the way. As the trauma model demonstrates, a national, comprehensive ap-
proach to this problem will save lives. Cf LAWRENCE 0. GosrIN & PETER D.
JACOBSON, LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 2 (2005) ("Virtually every aspect of public
health practice is defined and guided by law. A fundamental challenge facing public
health agencies is how to use the law as a tool to improve the public's health."). In-
deed, the American Heart Association's task force on strokes recommends just such a
protocol for strokes, i.e., that stroke patients should "be transported to the nearest
primary stroke center or hospital with an equivalent designation, given the available
acute therapeutic interventions." Lee H. Schwamm et al., Recommendations for the
Establishment of Stroke Systems of Care: Recommendations from the American
Stroke Association's Task Force on the Development of Stroke Systems, 36 STROKE
690, 695 (2005), available at http://stroke.ahajoumals.org/cgi/content/full/36/3/690.
98 ANGIOPLASTY.ORG, supra note 22.
99 Given the uncertainty that accompanies any regulatory change, some may
be concerned about increased liability. While such a fear is misplaced, given that
outcomes will be improved with a heart attack-diversion plan, the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program (the "VICP") offers a useful model to displace private
liability should one be necessary to co-opt relevant stakeholders. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
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but these inefficiencies are one cause of the sub-optimal and sub-
standard health delivery system in the United States. 10' This may be
due, in part, to the significant influence of highly-focused and well-
funded interest groups on policy in the United States. The outcome of
such lobbying is often legislative and regulatory inaction driven by the
political inertia of the status quo.
1. "Money money money money, money
1°2
As with any successful program, funding sources must exist.
Trauma care took a dramatic step forward in 1990 with the passage of
the Trauma Care Systems Planning and Development Act of 1990
(Trauma Care Act). 10 3 The Trauma Care Act established a federal
matching funds program for State trauma systems, with control for the
program vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS).
The Trauma Care Act did more than provide federal funding, it
also established systems to encourage movement towards a universal
trauma care system. As such, the Trauma Care Act:
a. established the Advisory Council on Trauma Care Sys-
tems and a National Clearinghouse on Trauma Care and
Emergency Medical Services; 1 4
15 (2005). The VICP program provides for a federal system of compensation for
injury resulting from vaccination that, at the option of the injured, displaces the tradi-
tional tort system that governs medical malpractice, personal injury, and product
liability cases. Individuals injured by a covered vaccine file a claim with the federal
government for recovery. The program has virtually eliminated litigation against drug
manufacturers and health care professionals administering vaccines. The Department
of Justice credits the program with stabilizing the supply of vaccines and increasing
the development of new vaccines. U.S. Department of Justice, About the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/torts/const/vicp/
about.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2006). Of course, such a system is not inexpensive,
and the costs will be borne by taxpayers.
100 See CIA.gov, CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
101 William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1702-03 (1999).
102 THE O'JAYS, FOR THE LOVE OF MONEY (Sony 1973).
103 Pub. L. No. 101-590, 104 Stat. 2915 (1990).
104 The Clearinghouse was designed to:
(1) [fjoster the development of appropriate, modern trauma care and emer-
gency medical services (including the development of policies for the
notification of family members of individuals involved in medical
emergencies) through the sharing of information among agencies and
individuals involved in planning, furnishing, and studying such services
and care;
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b. required the Federal government to develop, and States to
adopt, standards for: the designation of trauma centers, pa-
tient triage, patient transfer, and patient transportation
policies;
c. required the Secretary of HHS to review the trauma care
portion of States' plans for the provision of emergency
services; and'0 5
d. tied States' highway funding to requiring the State officer
responsible for the State highway safety program to par-
ticipate in the development of any State emergency medi-
cal services plan. 1°6
Finally, critical to the trauma care system is the statutory require-
ment "to provide appropriate transportation and transfer policies to
ensure the delivery of patients to designated trauma centers and other
facilities within and outside of the jurisdiction of such system."' 0 7
2. Model Federal and State Directed Transport Statutes for Heart
Attack Patients
State 0 8 and federal' 9 statutes mandating transport of trauma pa-
tients to certified trauma care facilities and providing resources for
(2) collect, compile, and disseminate information on the achievements of,
and problems experienced by, State and local agencies and private enti-
ties in providing trauma care and emergency medical services and, in
so doing, give special consideration of the unique needs of rural areas;
(3) provide technical assistance relating to trauma care and emergency
medical services to State and local agencies; and
(4) sponsor workshops and conferences on trauma care and emergency
medical services.
Id.
105 The Trauma Care Act requires "modifications to the State [trauma care]
plan as may be necessary for the State involved to ensure that the plan provides for
access to the highest possible quality of trauma care." Id. (emphasis added).
106 Id.; This negative incentive, i.e., "stick," of possible removal of existing
highway Federal funding augments the positive incentive, i.e., "carrot," of potential
new funding for trauma care. The Federal government often adopts this dual incentive
approach to persuade State compliance with the goals of new Federal programs.
107 id.
108 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2205 (Supp. 2005) ("Permitted treatment
and medication; certification requirement; protocols"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
2222 (Supp. 2005) ("Trauma advisory board; membership; compensation; duties");
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-13-804 (2005) ("Powers and duties of the division"); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1797.222 (Deering 1990) ("Adoption of ordinances gov-
erning transport of patient"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3.5-704 (2005) ("Statewide
emergency medical and trauma care system - development and implementation -
duties of the department - rules adopted by board"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9706
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such systems serve as useful models for statutes directing heart attack
patients to PCI-equipped facilities proposed below.
Both state and federal statutes are necessary to implement an op-
timal universal heart attack pre-hospital directed transportation sys-
tem. The model federal statute for heart attack directed care provides
for a federal grant program, a model implementation plan for the
states, and an advisory council on directed care for heart attacks. 10
(1995) ("[Office of Emergency Medical Services] - Additional functions."); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 395.4045 (West 2006) ("Emergency medical service providers; trauma
transport protocols; transport of trauma alert victims to trauma centers; interfacility
transfer"); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3.30 (West 2000) ("EMS Region Plan;
Content"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147A.24 (West 2005) ("Trauma system advisory
council established"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147A.27 (West 2005) ("Department to
adopt rules"); MD. CODE REGS. 30.08.03.02 (1997) (amended 2002) ("Prehospital
Triage and Transport"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11 IC, § 3 (LexisNexis 2004) ("De-
partment of Health to Regulate Statewide EMS System."); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
l IC, § 11 (LexisNexis 2004) ("Department to Develop Statewide Coordinated
Trauma Care System; Regulations and Guidelines"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.20910 (West Supp. 2006) ("Powers and duties of department"); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.604 (West Supp. 2006) ("Trauma triage and transportation"); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-59-5 (2005) ("Establishment and administration of program"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 190.243 (West 2004) ("Transportation to trauma centers or hospitals, how
authorized"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-402 (2005) ("Department duties - rules");
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8235 (2003) ("Trauma system, defined"); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 450B.237 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) ("Establishment of program for treatment
of trauma; regulations; proposal to designate hospital as trauma center; approval by
Administrator of Health Division; standards; compliance"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
153-A:1 (LexisNexis 2002) ("Declaration of Policy and Purpose"); N.M. ADMIN.
CODE § 7.27.7.11 (LexisNexis 2005) ("Pre-hospital Transport Guidelines"); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-IOB-4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003) ("Bureau; duties"); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 708.5 (2006) ("Specific review criteria"); N.D. ADMiN.
CODE § 33-38-01-05 (2005) ("Local emergency medical services transport plans");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.09 (West 2006) ("Protocols for trauma care"); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4765.40 (West 2006) ("Written protocols for triage of adult and
pediatric trauma victims"); Omno ADMIN. CODE § 4765-14-05 (2003) ("Exceptions to
mandatory transport"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-2530.4 (West Supp. 2006)
("Oklahoma Trauma Systems Improvement and Development Advisory Council -
Members - Terms - Expenses - Duties"); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6925 (West
2003) ("Duties of department"); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 773.112
(Vernon 2003) ("Duties of Board; Rules"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8a-307 (2005)
("Patient destination"); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-111.3 (Supp. 2006) ("Statewide emer-
gency medical care system"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-804 (2005) ("Department of
health to promulgate rules; contents").
UP Pub. L. No. 101-590 (1990); Pub. L. No. 105-392 (1998).
110 Below is a portion of the proposed federal statute, provided fully in the
Appendix of this Article, addressing the issues in developing a heart-attack-directed
care system.
Heart Attack Care Systems Planning and Development Act
[Vol. 17:17
2007] REGULATING INEFFICIENCIES IN CARDIAC HEALTH CARE 41
SECTION 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAMS WITH RESPECT TO
HEART ATTACK CARE.
The Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is amended by insert-
ing a new subchapter:
SUBCHAPTER XXVII-HEART ATTACK CARE
Part A - General Authority and Duties of Secretary
SEC. 300ii. ESTABLISHMENT.
(b) GRANTS, COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, AND CONTRACTS-The
Secretary may make grants, and enter into cooperative agreements and
contracts, for the purpose of carrying out subsection (a).
SECTION 300ii-1. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HEART ATTACK CARE
SYSTEMS.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT-The Secretary shall establish an advisory council
to be known as the Advisory Council on Heart Attack Care Systems (hereaf-
ter in this section referred to as the "Council ").
SECTION 300ii-2. CLEARINGHOUSE ON HEART ATTACK CARE AND
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT-The Secretary shall by contract provide for the es-
tablishment and operation of a National Clearinghouse on Heart Attack
Care and Emergency Medical Services (hereafter in this section referred to
as the "Clearinghouse").
(b) DUTIES-The Clearinghouse shall-
(]) foster the development of appropriate, state of the art heart attack
care and emergency medical services (including the development of
policies for the notification of family members of individuals involved
in medical emergencies) through the sharing of information among
agencies and individuals involved in planning, furnishing, and study-
ing such services and care;
(3) provide technical assistance relating to heart attack care and medi-
cal services to state and local agencies; and
(a) HEART ATTACK CARE MODIFICATIONS TO STATE PLAN FOR
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES-With respect to the heart-attack
care component of a state plan for the provision of emergency medical ser-
vices, the modifications referred to in section 300ii-4(b) are such modifica-
tions to the state plan as may be necessary for the state involved to ensure
that the plan provides for access to the highest possible quality of heart
attack care, and that the plan
(1) specifies that the modifications required pursuant to paragraphs
(2) through (10) will be implemented by the principal state agency
with respect to emergency medical services or by the designee of such
agency;
(2) specifies any public or private entity that will designate heart
attack care regions and heart attack centers in the state;
(3) subject to subsection (b), contains standards and requirements for
the designation of heart attack centers, by such entity, including stan-
dards and requirements for
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Ideally, the federal statute would be coupled with state statutes
that focus on implementing a specific plan at the local level and will
vary depending on the implementation plan provided by the Secretary
of HHS." 1'
(A) the number and types of heart attack patients for whom such
centers must provide care in order to ensure that such centers
will have sufficient experience and expertise to be able to provide
quality care for heart attack patients;
(B) the resources and equipment needed by such centers; and
(C) the availability of rehabilitation services for heart attack pa-
tients;
(4) subject to subsection (b), contains standards and requirements for
the implementation of regional heart attack care systems, including
standards and guidelines for care in transporting patients to desig-
nated heart attack centers;
(5) subject to subsection (b), contains standards and requirements for
medically directed triage and transport of heart attack patients di-
rectly to designated heart attack centers;
(6) specifies procedures for the evaluation of designated heart attack
centers and heart attack care systems;
(9) provides appropriate transportation and transfer policies to ensure
the delivery of patients to designated heart attack centers and other fa-
cilities within and outside of the jurisdiction of such system, and to
provide periodic reviews of the transfers and the auditing of such
transfers that are determined to be appropriate;
(10) conducts public education activities concerning heart attack pre-
vention and obtaining access to optimal heart-attack care;...
(b) CERTAIN STANDARDS WITH RESPECT TO HEART ATTACK CARE
CENTERS AND SYSTEMS-
(2) QUALITY OF HEART ATTACK CARE-The highest quality of
heart attack care shall be the primary goal of state standards adopted
under this subsection.
(3) APPROVAL BY SECRETARY-The Secretary may not make pay-
ments under section 300ii-4(a) to a state if the Secretary determines
that the state has not taken into account national standards for heart
attack care; or the state has not, in adopting such standards, taken into
account the model plan developed under subsection (c).
(c) MODEL HEART ATTACK CARE PLAN-Not later than one year after
the date of the enactment of the Heart Attack Care Systems Planning and
Development Act, the Secretary shall develop a model plan for the designa-
tion of heart attack care centers and for triage, transfer and transportation
policies that may be adopted for guidance by the state.
]1 A model state statute addressing the issues in developing a heart attack
directed care system is provided below:
Heart-Attack-Care Systems and Emergency-Medical Systems:
(1) Within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, or the establishment of an
emergency medical service (EMS) provider,HI should that occur after the
enactment of this Act, each EMS provider shall develop and implement pro-
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3. Specialization of Critical Care Across Illnesses Resulting from
Directed Transport Systems
The success of directed transport in trauma care has already en-
couraged proposals for the same for other acute illnesses. United
States Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS) proposed directed transport for
stroke patients in both the last Congress (the 1 0 9 th) 112 and the 1 0 8 th. 13
The Stroke Treatment and Ongoing Prevention Act, if enacted, would,
inter alia, require the Secretary of HHS to establish a grant program
for states to develop statewide stroke care systems; develop a model
for training EMS personnel in the identification and treatment of
stroke patients; and issue recommendations and guidelines on best
practices for establishing and operating a stroke care system.' 4 Of
course, this is exactly the approach already adopted for trauma care
and the one proposed here for heart attack care.
Thus, the question is begged as to whether the existing trauma
care system, along with the adoption of directed care systems for,
inter alia, strokes and heart attacks, will eventually result in the pre-
hospital diversion of all critical EMS patients based upon illness or
tocols for: (a) the pre-hospital transport of heart-attack patients directly to
hospitals approved as percutaneous-coronary-intervention-capable centers
(PCI-Centers), and (b) interfacility patient transfer.
(2) The Department of Health (the DOH) shall specify by rule the subjects
and the minimum criteria related to: (a) prehospital-heart-attack-patient
direct transport to a PCI-Center, and (c) interfacility heart-attack-patient
transfer transport.
(3) The DOH may disapprove any part of an EMS provider's heart-attack-
patient-transport protocol if the DOH determines that the EMS provider's
heart-attack-patient-transport protocol is insufficient to ensure the expedi-
tious transportation of heart-attack patients to PCI-Centers. The DOH shall
issue protocols to the EMS provider if the EMS-provider's protocols are in-
sufficient. Heart-attack-patient-transport protocol rules pertaining to the
air transportation of heart-attack-patients shall be consistent with, but not
limited to, applicable Federal Aviation Administration regulation.
(4) The DOH shall adopt and enforce all rules necessary to administer this
section. The DOH shall adopt and enforce rules to specify the submission
and approval process for STEMI-patient-transport protocols or modifica-
tions to STEMI-patient-transport protocols by emergency medical services
providers.
(5) Transport of STEMI patients shall be governed by principles of timely
and medically appropriate care; consideration of reimbursement mecha-
nisms shall not supersede those principles.
See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 190.243 (2005) (providing an existing Missouri law similar to
section (5) of the proposed state statute).
112 See generally S. 1064, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
113 See generally S. 1909, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
114 S. 1064, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
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injury to optimally capable facilities. And, if so, is this outcome opti-
mal? The answer is yes to both.
Directed care systems improve public and patient health by con-
centrating resources in regional facilities rather than dispersing re-
sources among many institutions of significantly varying capability
and correct for the absence of the competitive forces that prevent this
natural consolidation. The result is better patient care through the de-
velopment of procedural expertise at a lower cost. 115 The success of
such programs will lead to the application of similar protocols to other
emergency critical care illnesses.
B. Regulating Information Asymmetries
The second area of inefficiency discussed in Section II is caused
by sub-optimal facilities, i.e., those without PCI facilities, advertising
as specialty hospitals with specific expertise in treating heart attacks,
e.g., "Chest Pain Centers." These hospitals solicit and acquire heart
attack patients and the attendant compensation, displacing better care
by other institutions. Given this failure of both the market and current
regulation to correct for this inefficiency, an alternative approach is
proposed below.
1. Mandatory Accreditation of "Chest Pain" and "Heart" Centers:
S. 1277-The Heart Attack Safety Act
Currently, the health care consuming public has no opportunity to
know based on labeling and related advertising which hospitals that
advertise as being capable to treat heart attacks, e.g., "Chest Pain Cen-
ters," are fully equipped with PCI capability.
A market can only be allocatively efficient if prices are accurate,
i.e., they approach the marginal cost of producing them.' 16 A require-
ment for accurate pricing (and the concomitant allocation of goods
and services to their highest-value use) "is that consumers understand
... what they are buying."'1 7 If information is imbalanced in favor of
sellers over buyers, disclosure laws can restore the symmetry of
knowledge and allow consumers to make efficient purchases." 8 In-
15 MacKenzie et al., supra note 61, at 1521 (concentration of trauma patients
in a few facilities improves patients' outcomes by increasing experience and expertise
in these centers and decreases costs by reducing or eliminating unnecessary duplica-
tion of expensive resources); see also Michael S. Lauder, Primary Angioplasty - Time
Is of the Essence, 283 JAMA 2988, 2989 (2000).
116 Sage, supra note 101, at 1716.
117 id.
118 Id.
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deed, information asymmetry and the market power that it creates
have long been identified as the main cause for health care market
failure.1 19
Like the denomination "Trauma Center" for accredited facilities
independently determined to meet the American College of Surgeon's
stringent criteria, Chest Pain Center and similar designations claiming
the ability to treat heart attacks should be the designation used only by
fully equipped facilities that apply an organized and systematic ap-
proach to the early diagnosis and treatment of heart attacks.
20
The aforementioned letter from the seven prominent U.S. Sena-
tors to the American Heart Association and the American College of
Cardiology recognized this very fact, as well:
Currently, any facility can call itself a Chest Pain Center
without accreditation. There is no way for the public to know
which Chest Pain Center is legitimate and which is not. Hos-
pitals with Chest Pain Centers should only be able to make
such claims if they are accredited as Chest Pain Centers.'
21
Former Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican from Ohio, known
both for his commitment to health and safety issues and his inclusive
approach to legislation, introduced the Heart Attack Safety Act
(HASA).122 If enacted, HASA would amend Title XVIII of the Social
119 Id.
120 By definition, technology is always evolving. Indeed, this evolution is the
cause of current treatment disparities. Under current standards, the minimum appro-
priate technology is the availability of PCI. See Moyer et al., supra note 14, at 53, 55.
Currently, the Society of Chest Pain Centers does not support restricting accreditation
only to facilities with PCI capability due to the belief that accreditation of non-PCI
facilities may still result in improved patient care. For example, the Society supports
accreditation for those facilities that implement systemic procedures requiring imme-
diate transfer of patients with contraindications for fibrolynics and presenting with a
ST-elevated myocardial infarctions, i.e., a patient with a profile of "Mark" described
above. (Under the directed transport model presented in this Article, a patient with
this profile would be brought directly to a PCI facility should he be transported by
EMS.) While rapid transfer procedures would likely have saved Mark's life, the au-
thor of this Article disagrees with designating these facilities as "Chest-Pain Centers."
Such a designation falsely suggests (to "walk-in" patients, in particular) the ability of
the facility to fully address under contemporary technologies all ACS patients' prob-
lems. Accordingly, this author supports offering some designation to facilities seeking
to improve their system of addressing ACS. However, the ability to advertise this
improved-systems approach should not be at the expense of clarity to acute-healthcare
consumers.
121 Letter from United States Senators, to the Am. Heart Ass'n and Am. Coll.
of Cardiology, supra note 48.
122 See generally S. 1277, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
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Security Act to require hospitals, as a condition of participation under
the Medicare program, to meet specific requirements set by the Secre-
tary of HHS in order to advertise that they have the capability of ad-
dressing emergency and acute coronary syndromes.
121
Moreover, HASA specifically states that a hospital that character-
izes itself as having a "Chest Pain Center" is advertising as having the
capability of addressing emergency or acute coronary syndromes, as
defined by the Act. 124 HASA does not set forth the technology that a
hospital must have in order to qualify for the designation as a Chest
Pain Center or the like. Rather, HASA would empower the Secretary
of HHS to set standards appropriate for the contemporary technology.
As such, the required technology would be updated with advances in
medical science. 125
Accordingly, HASA addresses the market imperfection by man-
dating the provision of accurate information to consumers. Its enact-
ment will improve the market for health-care services--driving down
costs and saving lives at the same time-by expanding the quality of
information about heart attack care provided to consumers. It is a
modest proposal whose time has come.
2. Market Efficiency Through Information Regulation
Regulating consumer information asymmetries is designed to cor-
rect for the distorting effect of advertising on the market, and, as such,
can be viewed as a type of product safety law. 126 Product safety laws
trace back to early English law, 127 and have changed dramatically in
the last 150 years.128 As mass production became possible around the
123 Id.
124 Id. The Society of Chest Pain Centers altruistically endorsed S. 1277,
notwithstanding that the HASA could remove from the Society its exclusive authority
for accrediting Chest Pain Centers. Letter from Robert Stomel, President, Society of
Chest Pain Centers, to Mike DeWine, U.S. Senator from Ohio (June 27, 2005) avail-
able at http://www.scpcp.org/hcfa/DeWine ltr S 1277.pdf.
12 Although various standards are theoretically available, I believe that only
two will ensure public safety given the state of medical science today. The first would
permit only PCI-capable facilities with proper heart attack treatment protocols to use
the designation "chest pain center" or the like. The second option would permit PCI-
capable hospitals with proper heart attack treatment protocols and those few hospitals
with proper heart attack treatment protocols without PCI capability that are over an
hour away from any PCI-capable facility to use the designation "chest pain center."
126 See PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM'N.,
ADVERTISING NUTRITION & HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM FOOD ADVERTISING 1977-1997 1
(2002).
127 JAMES J. MCGILLAN ET AL., CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY LAW 10 (1977).
128 12 AM. JUR. Trials § 2 (1966).
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beginning of the 20th century, the relationship between buyers and
sellers grew more attenuated, and the doctrine of caveat emptor no
longer occupied the position of accepted dogma that it once had.
129
Courts began to realize that consumers were largely unaware of the
relative safety of the products and services they purchased and that
this "ignorance and naivet6" necessitated changes in order to protect
the public. 130
While patronizing, the description of the public as "'bewitched,
bewildered and bedeviled by the glittering packaging in riotous color
and the alluring enticement of the products' qualities as depicted on
labels ' 3 1 highlights the difficulties faced by the consumers in today's
technologically advanced age. Advertising campaigns have "'lulled,"'
if not numbed, once cautious consumers about their safety.
132
Whereas advertising certainly can notify consumers about the
quality of the products or services offered, 133 the goal of advertising is
to provide, at the least possible cost, certain information to consumers
that will make the advertisers' products or services more attractive
than those of their competitors.' 4 Advertising need not impede con-
sumers' ability to gather full information 135 but is antithetical to pur-
suing this goal if its satisfaction conflicts with maximizing revenue. 3
6
Thus, ideally, utilizing advertising for its "best" purposes may lower
consumers' cost of acquiring information, 137 but if information is in-
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE
73 (1993) (quoting Hamon v. Digliani, 174 A.2d 294, 297 (Conn. 1961)).
132 Id. at 74 (quoting Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 467 P.2d 256, 261-62
(Ariz. 1970)).
133 IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 126, at E-20, 130 (advertising is
described as a "major feature of consumer good markets" and "a response to the
market's need for information").
134 See id. at 133-37; see also Pauline M. Ippolito, What Can We Learn From
Food Advertising Policy Over the Last 25 Years?, 12 GEO MASON L. REv. 939, 946-
47 ("[this is the] fundamental force underlying the information theory of advertis-
ing").
135 See IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 126, at 130.
136 Robert H. Schmerling, The Promise and Pitfalls of Patient Empowerment,
INTELIHEALTH.COM, Oct. 16, 2002, http://www.intelihealth.com (follow "Health
Commentaries" hyperlink; then follow "Medical Myths" hyperlink; then follow "The
Promise and Pitfalls of Patient Empowerment" hyperlink) (last visited on May 17,
2006); see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REv 741, 777 (1982) ("advertising often relies on an appeal to non-deliberative ele-
ments").
137 Id.
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sufficient or inaccurate, the quality of goods or services supplied can
be distorted negatively. 
38
Regulation requiring information disclosure allows consumers to
make rational purchase decisions on the basis of product or service
quality without having to undertake the prohibitive expense of inde-
pendently determining quality. 39 Indeed, the case for regulation re-
quiring disclosure is strongest when a product characteristic or service
quality is not readily discoverable by inspection or repeated use.
140
Moreover, placing the onus to disclose on the parties possessing the
information is typically cheaper, and, therefore, more efficient than
requiring uninformed consumers to ferret out and gather the relevant
information on their own. 141 This results in the proper valuation of
goods and services and appropriate resource allocation.
Even profit-maximizing opponents of the first proposal of this Ar-
ticle--diverting critical ACS patients to fully equipped facilities-
tacitly acknowledge the need for adequate information to the consum-
ing public regarding the capabilities of local community hospitals:
"Nancy E. Foster, vice president for quality of the American Hospital
Association, which represents both large and small hospitals [says:]
'Community hospitals may be equally good at delivering [critical]
care, and it would be important for patients to know how well pre-
pared their local hospital is.""
42
Indeed, the Federal government (often through the Federal Trade
Commission) routinely regulates all sorts of consumer advertising
regarding both health and non-health issues of much lower signifi-
cance than the provision of emergency medical care for acute heart
attacks. 43 The myriad statutes and regulations demonstrate that "the
138 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 330-3 1.
139 Cf STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20,
20, 34-35 (2004) (state regulation of information disclosure in health care helps avoid
undesirable outcomes and is appropriate because the cost of individual searches is not
economically rational); see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 70, at 330-31.
140 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 113 (6th ed. 2002). See
SEIDENFELD, supra note 68, at 66 ("[Plerfect information is crucial to all aspects of
market dynamics and non-market transactions").
141 Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-4 (1978).
142 Burton, supra note 24 (emphasis added).
14 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2001) (regulating the labeling of drugs and
medical devices); 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (2001) (controlling advertising and mandating
labeling of smokeless tobacco); 16 C.F.R. §§ 307.1-307.12 (2005) (regulations im-
plementing the control of advertising and mandating labeling of smokeless tobacco);
15 U.S.C. § 5711 (2001) ("prohibit[s] unfair and deceptive acts and practices in any
advertisement for pay-per-call services"); 16 C.F.R. §§ 308.1-308.9 (2005) (regula-
tions implementing the control of advertisement for pay-per-call services); 16 C.F.R.
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law of deception has now developed to the point of virtually eliminat-
ing any line between advertisements which are deceptive and adver-
tisements which simply fail to inform."'144
For example, the Consumer Product Safety Act 145 (CPSA) was
enacted to protect the public from dangerous products by regulating
manufacturers and educating the public. 146 Congress stated that one of
its purposes in passing the CPSA was to address the "complexities of
consumer products and the diverse nature and abilities of consumers
using them [that] frequently result in an inability of users to anticipate
risks and to safeguard themselves adequately." 1
47
In fact, the Code of Federal Regulations devotes an entire section
to the advertising and labeling of automobile tires, noting that "[t]he
purchase of tires ...is an extremely important matter to the con-
sumer. Not only are substantial economic factors involved, but in
most instances the purchaser will entrust the safety of himself and
others to the performance of the product."' 148 The regulation requires
that consumers be given particular information prior to purchase in
order to avoid being deceived and injured.1 49
§ 424.1 (2005) (regulation of retail food store advertising); 16 C.F.R. § 233.1 (2005)
(advertisers are not permitted to claim that they've reduced prices when the prior
price was not a bona fide price at which the article was offered to the public on a
regular basis for a reasonably substantial period of time; sellers may not claim a sale
price when the reduction in price is so insignificant as to be meaningless); 16 C.F.R. §
233.2 (2005) (in advertising, sellers may not claim that they are offering a product
below the retail price even when the retail price is used by other sellers, if most out-
lets in the community do not sell at the retail price); 16 C.F.R. § 233.3 (2005) (in
advertising, sellers may not distinguish their price from the suggested retail price if
the latter is not used in the community); 16 C.F.R. § 233.4 (2005) (regulating the use
of the term "free" in advertising, and "2-for-l" advertisements must be transparent);
16 C.F.R. § 233.5 (2005) (ordinary prices may not be advertised as "wholesale"); 16
C.F.R. §§ 255.0-255.5 (2005) (regulating use of endorsements in advertising); 16
C.F.R. § 410.1 (2005) (regulating deceptive advertising as to sizes of viewable pic-
tures shown by television receiving sets); 16 C.F.R. §§ 423.1-423.10 (2005) (regulat-
ing information that must be provided to consumers prior to selling them clothing); 16
C.F.R. §§ 436.1-436.3 (2005) (regulating advertising regarding franchise and busi-
ness opportunity ventures); 16 C.F.R. § 455.2 (2005) (regulating certain advertising
by used car sellers); 16 C.F.R. §§ 460.1-460.24 (2005) (regulating advertising of
home insulation); 16 C.F.R. §§ 502.100-502.102 (2005) (regulating advertising on
packaging).
144 Beales et al., supra note 28, at 495; see §§ 29 U.S.C. 1021-1022 (2005);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4408 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1999) (statutes requiring
disclosure of terms of retirement and health packages).
145 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-84 (2001).
146 Id. at § 2051.
147 Id.
148 16 C.F.R. § 228.1(a) (2003) (repealed 2004).
149 Id. at § 228.1(b)(1). The information that the consumer must be given
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Given this long history of regulating consumer safety regarding
areas of a significantly less critical nature than the provision of emer-
gency medical care for ACS patients, along with the currently favored
regulatory strategy of expanding the amount of information about the
health care system,1 50 enacting guidelines for hospitals that advertise
the ability to address heart attacks fits well into today's complex legal
landscape.
CONCLUSION
This nation has developed and procured state-of-the-art technol-
ogy for medical treatment, as well as some of the most exceptional
medical practitioners the world has ever seen. This extraordinary
combination of talent and equipment results in the opportunity for
virtually all heart attack patients to receive treatment that could
greatly diminish, if not eliminate, the possibility of negative out-
comes. Nonetheless, Americans suffering acute heart attacks have a
high likelihood of receiving outdated treatment that too often results
in significant injury or death. The elements that determine which level
of care any given patient receives are: (1) the level of technology that
fortuitously is available at the closest hospital; and (2) the level of
false advertising by community hospitals that has permeated the local
market. These non-market and non-equity factors should not deter-
mine the life or death of heart attack patients.
Given that emergency medical care for frank heart attacks is vir-
tually price inelastic and that consumers are prevented from making
rational decisions on its provision by regulation and information
asymmetries, the paradigm for ACS treatment must be changed. A
system to direct heart attack patients to PCI-capable facilities will
benefit patients, the well-equipped facilities, and society as a whole:
patients will get the treatment that they deserve; hospitals that provide
optimal care will be appropriately compensated and not financially
undermined by non-PCI facilities siphoning off their income through
the non-market direction of consumers; and society will have fewer
preventable heart attack deaths. This very model has been in place for
many years for trauma care but, to date, has not been developed in any
systematic national program for any other acute illnesses. The analysis
and model statutes provided herein should aide in expediting such a
development.
includes: (1) the tire's "load-carrying capacity," (2) the type of cord material used in
manufacturing the tire, and (3) the number of plies. Id.150 Sage, supra note 101, at 1704.
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Similarly, policymakers routinely and appropriately regulate in-
formation asymmetries that cause market failures so as to increase
social welfare. The enactment of the Heart Attack Safety Act will
ensure that only properly equipped facilities can hold themselves out
as capable of treating acute heart attacks, thereby preventing ill-
equipped facilities from soliciting patients suffering these acute
events. As such, the market for heart attack care will operate more
competitively and, therefore, more efficiently.
The enactment of the legislative proposals discussed in Section III
will pursue the highest goal of medicine, law, and economics: to op-
timize the lots and lives of people.' 5 '
APPENDIX
Below is the proposed model federal statute addressing the issues
in developing a heart attack-directed care system referenced in the
Article, supra, at note 110:
HEART ATTACK CARE SYSTEMS PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT ACT
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE:
This Act shall be known as the Heart Attack Care
Systems Planning and Development Act.
SECTION 2. FINDINGS:
The Congress finds that
(1) the federal government and the governments of
the states have established a history of cooperation in
the development, implementation, and monitoring of
integrated, comprehensive systems for the provision
of emergency medical services throughout the United
States;
(2) heart attack is the leading cause of death of
Americans;
(3) cardiovascular disease-the leading cause of
heart attacks-results in an aggregate annual cost of
$300 trillion in medical expenses, insurance, lost
wages, and other expenses;
(4) barriers to the provision of prompt and appropri-
ate emergency medical services exist in many areas
of the United States;
151 See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 467
(2002) ("It is obvious that law has therapeutic consequences meriting study when, for
instance, it affects the behavior of physicians or the availability of treatment.").
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(5) few states and communities have developed and
implemented heart attack care systems; and
(6) the number of heart attacks in the United States is
a serious medical and social problem, and the num-
ber of deaths resulting from such incidents can be
substantially reduced by improving the heart attack
care components of the systems for the provision of
emergency medical services in the United States.
SECTION 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAMS
WITH RESPECT TO HEART ATTACK CARE.
The Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)
is amended by inserting a new subchapter:
SUBCHAPTER XXVII-HEARTATACK CARE
Part A - General Authority and Duties of Secretary
SEC. 300ii. ESTABLISHMENT.
(a) IN GENERAL-The Secretary shall, with respect
to heart attack care-
(1) conduct and support research, training,
evaluations, and demonstration projects;
(2) foster the development of appropriate,
modem systems of such care through the
sharing of information among agencies and
individuals involved in the study and provi-
sion of such care;
(3) provide to state and local agencies tech-
nical assistance; and
(4) sponsor workshops and conferences.
(b) GRANTS, COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, AND
CONTRACTS-The Secretary may make grants, and
enter into cooperative agreements and contracts, for
the purpose of carrying out subsection (a).
SECTION 300ii-1. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
HEART A7TACK CARE SYSTEMS.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT-The Secretary shall establish
an advisory council to be known as the Advisory
Council on Heart Attack Care Systems (hereafter in
this section referred to as the "Council").
(b) DUTIES-The Council shall-
(1) periodically conduct assessments of the
needs in the United States with respect to
heart attack care and the extent to which the
states are responding to such needs, includ-
ing special consideration of the unique needs
of rural areas;
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(2) submit to the Secretary the findings made
as a result of such assessments; and
(3) advise the Secretary with respect to ac-
tivities carried out under this title, including
the development of the model heart attack
plan.
(c) MEMBERSHIP-
(1) IN GENERAL-The Secretary shall ap-
point to the Council twelve appropriately
qualified representatives of the public who
are not officers or employees of the United
States. Of such members-
(A) At least three shall be individuals
experienced or specially trained in
cardiology (including a critical care
nurse);
(B) At least three shall be individuals
experienced or specially trained in
emergency medicine (including a
nurse who is specially trained in
emergency medicine); and
(C) At least three shall be individuals
experienced or specially trained in
the development, administration, or
financing of heart attack care sys-
tems.
(2) EX OFFICIO MEMBERS-The Secretary
may designate as ex officio members of the
Council appropriately qualified representa-
tives of the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Department of Transportation,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
and such other agencies of the federal gov-
ernment as the Secretary determines to have
functions affecting emergency medical ser-
vices.
(3) KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING RURAL
AREAS-Of the members described in para-
graph (1), twenty-five percent of the members
shall be knowledgeable about the unique
needs of rural areas with respect to the pur-
pose of the Council.
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(d) TERMS-
(1) GENERAL TERM-Except as provided in
paragraph (2), members of the Council ap-
pointed under subsection (c)(1) shall serve
for a term offour years.
(2) INITIAL MEMBERS-Of the members
first appointed to the Council under subsec-
tion (c)(1), the Secretary shall appoint four
members to serve for a term of four years,
four members to serve for a term of three
years, and four members to serve for a term
of two years.
(e) VACANCIES-
(1) SERVICE FOR REMAINDER OF
TERM-Any member of the Council ap-
pointed under subsection (c)(1) to fill a va-
cancy occurring before the expiration of the
term of the predecessor of the member shall
be appointed for the remainder of the term of
the predecessor.
(2) CONTINUED SERVICE AFTER
EXPIRATION OF TERM-A member of the
Council appointed under subsection (c)(1)
may continue to serve after the expiration of
the term of the member until a successor is
appointed.
(f) CHAIR-The Secretary, or the designee of the
Secretary, shall serve as the chair of the Council.
(g) MEETINGS-The Council shall meet at the call
of the Chair and shall meet not less than once each
three months.
(h) COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF
EXPENSES-
(1) FEDERAL OFFICIALS-Ex officio mem-
bers of the Council under subsection (c)(2)
may not receive compensation for service on
the Council in addition to the compensation
otherwise received for duties carried out as
officers or employees of the United States.
(2) APPOINTMENT MEMBERS-Members
of the Council appointed under subsection
(c)(1) may not receive compensation for ser-
vice on the Council. Such members may be
reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other
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necessary expenses incurred in carrying out
the duties of the Council.
(i) STAFF-The Secretary shall provide to the Coun-
cil such staff, information, and other assistance as
may be necessary to carry out the duties of the Coun-
cil.
(j) TERMINATION-Notwithstanding section 14(a)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Council
shall continue in existence until otherwise provided
by law.
SECTION 300ii-2. CLEARINGHOUSE ON HEART
ATTACK CARE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT-The Secretary shall by con-
tract provide for the establishment and operation of a
National Clearinghouse on Heart Attack Care and
Emergency Medical Services (hereafter in this sec-
tion referred to as the "Clearinghouse ").
(b) DUTIES-The Clearinghouse shall-
(1) foster the development of appropriate,
state of the art heart attack care and
emergency medical services (including the
development of policies for the notification of
family members of individuals involved in
medical emergencies) through the sharing of
information among agencies and individuals
involved in planning, furnishing, and study-
ing such services and care;
(2) collect, compile, and disseminate infor-
mation on the achievements of and problems
experienced by, state and local agencies and
private entities in providing heart attack care
and emergency medical services and, in so
doing, give special consideration of the
unique needs of rural areas;
(3) provide technical assistance relating to
heart attack care and medical services to
state and local agencies; and
(4) sponsor workshops and conferences on
heart attack care and emergency medical
services.
(c) FEES AND ASSESSMENTS-A contract entered
into by the Secretary under this section may provide
that the Clearinghouse charge fees or assessments in
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order to address the costs of operating the Clearing-
house.
SECTION 300ii-3. ESTABLISHMENT OF
PROGRAMS FOR IMPROVING HEART ATTACK
CARE IN RURAL AREAS.
(a) IN GENERAL-The Secretary may make grants
to public and nonprofit private entities for the pur-
pose of carrying out research and demonstration pro-
jects with respect to improving the availability and
quality of emergency medical services in rural areas
(1) by developing innovative uses of commu-
nications technologies and the use of new
communications technology;
(2) by developing model curricula for train-
ing emergency medical services personnel,
including first responders, emergency medi-
cal technicians, emergency nurses and physi-
cians, and paramedics
(A) in the assessment, stabilization,
treatment, preparation for transport,
and resuscitation of heart attack
patients, with special attention to
problems that arise during long
transports and to methods of mini-
mizing delays in transport to the op-
timal facility; and
(B) in the management of the opera-
tion of the emergency medical ser-
vices system;
(3) by making training for original certifica-
tion, and continuing education, in the provi-
sion and management of emergency medical
services more accessible to emergency medi-
cal personnel in rural areas through tele-
communications, home studies, providing
teachers and training at locations accessible
to such personnel, and other methods;
(4) by developing innovative protocols and
agreements to increase access to prehospital
care and equipment necessary for the trans-
portation of heart attack patients to the opti-
mal facilities; and
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(5) by evaluating the effectiveness of proto-
cols with respect to emergency medical ser-
vices and systems.
Part B - Formula Grants With Respect to Modifica-
tions of State Plans
SECTION 300ii-4. ESTABLISHMENT OF
PROGRAM.
(a) REQUIREMENT OF ALLOTMENTS
FOR STATES-The Secretary shall for each
fiscal year make an allotment for each state
in an amount determined by the Secretary.
The Secretary shall make payments, as
grants, each fiscal year to each state from the
allotment for the state if the Secretary ap-
proves for the fiscal year involved an appli-
cation submitted by the state.
(b) PURPOSE-The Secretary may not make
payments under this part for a fiscal year
unless the state involved agrees that, with re-
spect to the heart attack care component of
the State plan for the provision of emergency
medical services, the payments will be ex-
pended only for the purpose of developing,
implementing, and monitoring the modifica-
tions to such component described in section
300ii-6.
SECTION 300ii-5. REQUIREMENT OF MATCHING
FUNDS FOR FISCAL YEARS SUBSEQUENT TO
FIRST FISCAL YEAR OF PAYMENTS.
(a) NON-FEDERAL CONTRIBUTIONS-
(1) IN GENERAL-The Secretary may not
make payments under section 300ii-4(a)
unless the state involved agrees, with respect
to the costs described in paragraph (2), to
make available non-federal contributions (in
cash or in kind under subsection (b)(1))
toward such costs in an amount equal to
(A) for the second fiscal year of such
payments to the state, not less than
$1 for each $1 of federal funds
provided in such payments for such
fiscal year; and
(B) for any subsequent fiscal year of
such payments to the state, not less
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than $3 for each $1 of federal funds
provided in such payments for such
fiscal year.
(2) PROGRAM COSTS-The costs referred
to in paragraph (1) are
(A) the costs to be incurred by the
state in carrying out the purpose de-
scribed in section 300ii-4(c), or
(B) the costs of improving the quality
and availability of emergency medi-
cal services in rural areas of the
state.
(3) INITIAL YEAR OF PAYMENTS--The
Secretary may not require a state to make
non-federal contributions as a condition of
receiving payments under section 300ii-4(a)
for the first fiscal year of such payments to
the state.
(b) DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF NON-
FEDERAL CONTRIBUTION-With respect to
compliance with subsection (a) as a condition of
receiving payments under section 300ii-4(a)-
(1) a state may make the non-federal contri-
butions required in such subsection in cash
or in kind, fairly evaluated, including plant,
equipment, or services;
(2) the Secretary may not, in making a de-
termination of the amount of non-federal
contributions, include amounts provided by
the federal government or services assisted
or subsidized to any significant extent by the
Federal Government.
SECTION 300ii-6. REQUIREMENTS WITH
RESPECT TO CARRYING OUT PURPOSE OF
ALLOTMENTS.
(a) HEART ATTACK CARE MODIFICATIONS TO
STATE PLAN FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES-With respect to the heart attack care
component of a state plan for the provision of emer-
gency medical services, the modifications referred to
in section 300ii-4(b) are such modifications to the
state plan as may be necessary for the state involved
to ensure that the plan provides for access to the
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highest possible quality of heart attack care, and that
the plan
(1) specifies that the modifications required
pursuant to paragraphs (2) through (10) will
be implemented by the principal state agency
with respect to emergency medical services
or by the designee of such agency;
(2) specifies any public or private entity that
will designate heart attack care regions and
heart attack centers in the state;
(3) subject to subsection (b), contains stan-
dards and requirements for the designation
of heart attack centers, by such entity, includ-
ing standards and requirements for
(A) the number and types of heart
attack patients for whom such cen-
ters must provide care in order to
ensure that such centers will have
sufficient experience and expertise to
be able to provide quality care for
heart attack patients;
(B) the resources and equipment
needed by such centers; and
(C) the availability of rehabilitation
services for heart attack patients;
(4) subject to subsection (b), contains stan-
dards and requirements for the implementa-
tion of regional heart attack care systems, in-
cluding standards and guidelines for care in
transporting patients to designated heart at-
tack centers;
(5) subject to subsection (b), contains stan-
dards and requirements for medically di-
rected triage and transport of heart attack
patients directly to designated heart attack
centers;
(6) specifies procedures for the evaluation of
designated heart attack centers and heart at-
tack care systems;
(7) provides for the establishment and collec-
tion of data from each designated heart at-
tack center in the State of a central data re-
porting and analysis system
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(A) to identify the number of heart
attack patients within regional heart
attack care systems in the state;
(B) to identify the nature and severity
of the heart attack;
(C) to monitor heart attack patient
care (including prehospital care) in
each designated heart attack center
within regional heart attack care sys-
tems in the State (including relevant
emergency department discharges
and rehabilitation information) for
the purpose of evaluating the diag-
nosis, treatment and treatment out-
come of such heart attack patients;
(D) to identify the total amount of
uncompensated heart attack care ex-
penditures for each fiscal year by
each designated heart attack center
in the state; and
(E) to identify patients transferred
within a regional heart attack sys-
tem, including reasons for such
transfer;
(8) provides for the use of procedures by
paramedics and emergency medical techni-
cians to assess the type and severity of the
heart attack experienced by acute coronary
syndrome patients;
(9) provides appropriate transportation and
transfer policies to ensure the delivery of pa-
tients to designated heart attack centers and
other facilities within and outside of the ju-
risdiction of such system, and provides peri-
odic reviews of the transfers and the auditing
of such transfers that are determined to be
appropriate;
(10) conducts public education activities
concerning heart attack prevention and ob-
taining access to optimal heart attack care;
and
(11) with respect to the requirements estab-
lished in this subsection, provides for coordi-
nation and cooperation between the state and
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any other state with which the state shares
any standard metropolitan statistical area.
(b) CERTAIN STANDARDS WITH RESPECT TO
HEART ATTACK CARE CENTERS AND
SYSTEMS-
(1) IN GENERAL-The Secretary may not
make payments under section 300ii-4(a) for a
fiscal year unless the state involved agrees
that, in carrying out paragraphs (3) through
(5) of subsection (a), the state will adopt
standards for the designation of heart attack
centers and for triage, transfer, and trans-
portation policies, and that the state will, in
adopting such standards-
(A) take into account national stand-
ards concerning such;
(B) consult with medical, surgical,
and nursing specialty groups, hospi-
tal associations, emergency medical
services state and local directors,
concerned advocates and other in-
terested parties;
(C) conduct hearings on the pro-
posed standards after providing ade-
quate notice to the public concerning
such hearing; and
(D) take into account the model plan
described in subsection (c).
(2) QUALITY OF HEART ATTACK CARE-
The highest quality of heart attack care shall
be the primary goal of state standards
adopted under this subsection.
(3) APPROVAL BY SECRETARY-The Sec-
retary may not make payments under section
300ii-4(a) to a state if the Secretary deter-
mines that the state has not taken into ac-
count national standards for heart attack
care, or the state has not, in adopting such
standards, taken into account the model plan
developed under subsection (c).
(c) MODEL HEART ATTACK CARE PLAN-Not
later than one year after the date of the enactment of
the Heart Attack Care Systems Planning and Devel-
opment Act, the Secretary shall develop a model plan
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for the designation of heart attack care centers and
for triage, transfer, and transportation policies that
may be adopted for guidance by the state.
